
The Country That Built Both the Sword and the Shield
How China’s rare earth and BeiDou supply chains underpin both Israeli missile defense and Iranian strike capabilities, and what this means for defense…
April 2, 2026
Anna K.Country Intelligence
United States stands out in this dataset through policy leverage over trade and investment, named industrial and corporate presence, and processing and refining capacity, with its strongest relevance showing up in Beryllium, Tellurium, and Molybdenum.
This country matters primarily because it can influence market access, investment flows, and compliance rules across strategic materials.
Strategic Read
United States matters less as a dominant mine supplier and more as a country that can shape market access, compliance, and investment signals.
Policy events
48
Materials covered
18
Leading materials
Why United States matters
Primary read
Policy driver
Why it matters
United States matters less as a dominant mine supplier and more as a country that can shape market access, compliance, and investment signals.
What to watch
Watch policy changes, permitting, and trade rules alongside any shift in Beryllium exposure.
Coverage signals
Materials covered
18
Linked policy events
48
Refining appearances
12
Named companies
28
These are dataset signals showing how often United States appears across strategic materials research, not official reserve or production totals.
Mining / upstream supply
Very High
6
Refining / processing
Very High
12
Policy leverage
Very High
48
Industrial presence
Very High
28
Where United States appears in the dataset
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Beryllium matters here because of producer signal: ~50% (180 tonnes, 2024 est.), refining share: 50%, 2 named players, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
~50% (180 tonnes, 2024 est.)
Refining share
50%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Tellurium matters here because of producer signal: 60-80 t/yr (12-14%), refining share: 13%, and 2 named players.
Producer signal
60-80 t/yr (12-14%)
Refining share
13%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Molybdenum matters here because of producer signal: ~18% (51,900 tonnes), refining share: 18%, and 1 named player.
Producer signal
~18% (51,900 tonnes)
Refining share
18%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Dysprosium matters here because of producer signal: <1% (Energy Fuels pilot), refining share: 1%, and 4 named players.
Producer signal
<1% (Energy Fuels pilot)
Refining share
1%
Processing and refining relevance
Tantalum matters here because of refining share: 15%, 4 named players, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Refining share
15%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Neodymium matters here because of producer signal: ~15% mining, refining share: 1%, and 1 named player.
Producer signal
~15% mining
Refining share
1%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Terbium matters here because of producer signal: <1% (scaling), refining share: 1%, and 1 named player.
Producer signal
<1% (scaling)
Refining share
1%
Processing and refining relevance
Vanadium matters here because of refining share: 4% (5,700 (secondary sources, 2023)), 3 named players, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Refining share
4% · 5,700 (secondary sources, 2023)
Processing and refining relevance
Gold matters here because of refining share: 8% and 1 named player.
Refining share
8%
Processing and refining relevance
Copper matters here because of refining share: 4% and 1 named player.
Refining share
4%
Processing and refining relevance
Germanium matters here because of refining share: 1% (~12), 4 named players, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Refining share
1% · ~12
Processing and refining relevance
Graphite matters here because of refining share: 1% and 1 named player.
Refining share
1%
Corporate and industrial relevance
Niobium matters here because of 4 named players and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Corporate and industrial relevance
Gallium matters here because of 2 named players and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Corporate and industrial relevance
Cobalt matters here because of 1 named player.
Supply-chain source relevance
Tin matters here because of appears in chokepoint analysis.
Strategic relevance
Selenium matters here because of appears in chokepoint analysis.
Supply-chain source relevance
Tungsten is one of the materials where this country appears in the intelligence dataset.
Industrial footprint by material
| Material | Roles | Producer signal | Refining |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beryllium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | ~50% (180 tonnes, 2024 est.) | 50% |
| Tellurium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player | 60-80 t/yr (12-14%) | 13% |
| Molybdenum | Producer, Refiner, Key Player | ~18% (51,900 tonnes) | 18% |
| Dysprosium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player | <1% (Energy Fuels pilot) | 1% |
| Tantalum | Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | N/A | 15% |
| Neodymium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player | ~15% mining | 1% |
| Terbium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player | <1% (scaling) | 1% |
| Vanadium | Source, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | N/A | 4% · 5,700 (secondary sources, 2023) |
| Gold | Source, Refiner, Key Player | N/A | 8% |
| Copper | Source, Refiner, Key Player | N/A | 4% |
| Germanium | Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | N/A | 1% · ~12 |
| Graphite | Source, Refiner, Key Player | N/A | 1% |
| Niobium | Key Player, Chokepoint | N/A | N/A |
| Gallium | Key Player, Chokepoint | N/A | N/A |
| Cobalt | Source, Key Player | N/A | N/A |
| Tin | Source, Chokepoint | N/A | N/A |
| Selenium | Chokepoint | N/A | N/A |
| Tungsten | Source | N/A | N/A |
Companies and industrial actors linked to United States
USA
Only fully integrated mine-to-finished-product beryllium supply chain in the West. Spor Mountain mine (UT), Delta mill (UT), Elmore refinery (OH). Dominates Western supply.
USA
Aerospace and defense beryllium-aluminum (AlBeMet) and BeCu product manufacturing.
USA
Superalloy turbine blades; LEAP and GE9X engines
USA
Grasberg (Indonesia) and Morenci (US); major global producer
USA
Mountain Pass mine (California). LREE-dominated; HREE separation commissioning targeted mid-2026. DoD partnership for domestic magnet production.
USA
White Mesa Mill (Utah). 99.9% Dy2O3 qualified Dec 2025. Targeting 48 t/yr Dy oxide by mid-2027 from monazite feedstock.
USA
RapidSX facility in Louisiana. US$22.4M government funding. Commissioning targeted H2 2026.
USA
Magnet-to-Magnet (M2M) recycling. 250+ t/yr initial capacity, design capacity 1,000-2,000 t/yr.
USA
GaAs and InP substrate manufacturer; sources gallium globally
USA
III-V semiconductor compound manufacturing
USA
World's largest optical fiber manufacturer; GeO₂ core dopant consumer
USA
HPGe gamma-ray detectors for nuclear security and medical imaging
USA
World's largest gold miner; ~6 Moz/year production
Australia/USA
Synthetic graphite anode development in US
USA
Only active US rare earth mine (Mountain Pass, CA); building separation capacity
USA
Elk Creek project, Nebraska. ~7,350 t/yr FeNb potential. Permits secured; financing pending. 75% offtake contracted.
USA
Major Inconel 718 producer. Primary consumer of superalloy-grade niobium.
USA/Germany
Major NbTi and Nb3Sn superconductor wire producer for MRI, accelerator, and fusion magnets.
Australia/USA
Operates Wodgina Mine (WA) and Austin TX refinery. Principal conflict-free formal source. All grades including ITAR-compliant defence material.
Germany/USA
Subsidiary of Hyperion Metals. High-purity specialty tantalum and niobium products.
USA
Integrated capacitor manufacturer with internal tantalum processing in USA, UK, and Philippines.
USA
Major downstream consumer. Preferentially sources certified conflict-free tantalum from Rwanda and Australia.
USA
World's largest CdTe PV manufacturer and single largest Te consumer. ~21 GW nameplate capacity (2024). Sources Te via long-term offtakes with 5N Plus (primary) and Umicore (secondary). Operates closed-loop panel recycling.
USA
Copper mining and refining. Potential 30-40 t/yr from anode slimes. New processing facility announced in Arizona (2024).
USA
Mountain Pass mine; building in-house HREE separation. 3–5 t Tb/year (2023), scaling.
USA / Germany
Specializes in spent catalyst recycling via proprietary V-CYCLE roasting/melting process. Achieves >99% vanadium recovery from spent catalysts.
USA
High-purity V2O5 and electrolyte from secondary sources (petroleum residues, spent catalysts). Leading US producer of high-purity vanadium compounds. Demonstrated closed-loop VRFB electrolyte recycling.
USA
Velvet-Wood mine (Utah) received expedited 14-day critical minerals permitting in 2025. First domestic US primary vanadium since 2020. Production targeted for 2026.
Relevant policy and regulation
2025-2030
United States · US DoD / USGS
Target 500-1,000 tonnes of tantalum reserves (up from <100 tonnes). Defence Production Act invocations under consideration for domestic refining. IRA 30% investment tax credits for critical mineral processing.
Jan 2027
United States · US Government
EV batteries containing Chinese-processed graphite will completely lose access to the $7,500 tax credit. Major forcing function for Western anode supply.
Early 2026
United States · US Government
Modeled on Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Selenium may be included in future stockpile decisions.
Jul 2026
European Union · European Union
Matches US OSHA standard. Increases compliance costs for EU processors and further raises barriers to entry for European beryllium processing.
Mar 2026
China · Arkansas Congressional Delegation
Request for at least one year's supply of ferrovanadium and aerospace-grade V2O5, citing vulnerability of weapons supply chains to China-Russia supply dominance.
Jan 2026
United States · White House
Directs Commerce Dept to negotiate minimum import prices for critical minerals with trading partners, targeting price volatility that destabilises domestic investment.
2025
United States · US Trade Representative
25% tariffs applied to Chinese tungsten products (carbides, concentrates, oxides) to counter dependency and spur allied supply chains.
2025
United States · USGS / Department of the Interior
Official US critical mineral designation; no indium-specific stockpiling or production programs enacted as of 2026.
Nov 2025
United States · US Dept of the Interior (USGS)
First-time inclusion for Silver, reflecting its vital role in defense, grids, PV, and advanced electronics, plus a 64% US import reliance.
Nov 2025
United States · Anfield Energy Inc.
First domestic US primary vanadium mine since 2020. Received expedited 14-day critical minerals permitting. First production targeted for 2026.
Nov 9, 2025
China · MOFCOM (China)
Temporary relief through Nov 27, 2026. Licensing regime continues. Market uncertainty persists.
Nov 2025
United States · US Geological Survey
Beryllium maintained on updated list of 60 critical minerals, confirming continued strategic importance.
Nov 2025
United States · US Geological Survey
Vanadium designated among 60 critical minerals vital to economic and national security. Unlocks federal support for domestic production, expedited permitting, and potential stockpiling.
Nov 2025
United States · US Department of the Interior / USGS
Selenium acknowledged within institutional supply chain risk assessments. Reinforces strategic classification.
Oct 2025
United States · Metal Tech News / USGS
Potential future domestic US source, though development timeline and commercial viability are not yet established.
Oct 2025
Government of South Korea · Government of South Korea
First comprehensive strategy covering domestic extraction, separation, magnet manufacturing, and cooperation with US, Japan, and Australia.
Aug 2025
United States · US Executive Branch
Increased tariffs to 50% for selected countries, affecting Brazilian vanadium products and further constraining non-Chinese supply routes.
Jul 2025
United States · US Department of Defense / MP Materials
Multi-billion-dollar deal with equity investment, loans, 10-year price floor (US$110+/kg NdPr), and exclusive 10-year magnet offtake. Largest US government action on RE supply chains.
Jun 2025
United States · US Department of Defense
Enhances domestic refining capacity to reduce import reliance and strengthen defense supply chain resilience.
Apr 2025
United States · US Executive Branch
10% tariff on most imports effective April 5, 2025. Affects vanadium product imports and raises costs for US consumers.
Jan 2025
United States · US Executive Branch
Strategic stockpile program modeled on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Participation from GM, Boeing, Google. Could support vanadium procurement.
Jan 2025
China · USGS
Official confirmation of China's ban; highlights 100% US import dependency.
2023–2024
United States · Copper Development Association (US)
Applying USGS methodology, copper's supply risk score rose from 0.334 (2018) to 0.488 (2023), exceeding the 0.40 threshold. Argues copper should be added to the 2025 USGS Critical Minerals List.
Dec 2024
China · MOFCOM (China)
Complete ban on Ga shipments to US. Further tightening of supply for American semiconductor manufacturers.
Dec 3, 2024
China · MOFCOM (Announcement No. 46)
Complete ban. Prices reach $2,850-3,000/kg (99.999%). US scrambles for alternative sources.
Dec 2024
United States · US Department of Energy
Documents 100% US import reliance for finished RE magnets. Recommends accelerated domestic production.
2024
United States · USGS
Formal recognition of high supply risk and strategic importance for clean energy and defense. No formal US stockpiling program yet, but DoD discussions ongoing.
Nov 2024
United States · US Federal Register
Dysprosium included alongside all rare earths. Triggers Defence Production Act funding eligibility, tax incentives, and streamlined permitting.
Jun 2024
United States · Toshiba, Sojitz, CBMM
Milestone for niobium battery technology commercialization. NTO-anode batteries demonstrated ultra-fast 10-minute charging in electric bus prototype.
May 2024
United States · U.S. Department of Defense
Through 2026: restrictions on magnets "melted or produced" in covered nations. From 2027: expanded to "mined, refined, separated, melted, or produced."
May 2024
United States · US Treasury
Acknowledging the impossibility of sourcing non-Chinese anodes immediately, the US grants a 2-year grace period for graphite tracing under the FEOC rules.
2022
United States · US Congress
30% Investment Tax Credit for solar manufacturing (technology-neutral, covering CdTe) with 10% domestic content bonus. First Solar's US facilities qualify directly.
2022
China · US Department of the Interior
Cites 90% supply dependence on China and essential defense applications. IRA allocates >$250M for rare earth mining and processing.
2022
United States · US Geological Survey
Formal critical mineral designation enables priority permitting, stockpile funding, and supply chain analysis.
Aug 2022
United States · US Government
Sets strict local sourcing requirements for battery components to qualify for the $7,500 EV tax credit, targeting Chinese anode dominance.
Aug 2022
China · US Congress
EV tax credit ($7,500) requires 40–80% FTA-sourced critical minerals (2023–2027). Only 8% of refined cobalt is IRA-compliant. Excludes China, DRC, Indonesia.
Sep 2021
United States · U.S. Department of Commerce / BIS
Formal investigation into national security impact of NdFeB magnet imports. Documents qualification barriers and supply chain vulnerabilities.
Feb 2021
United States · U.S. Department of Energy
DOE frames comprehensive NdFeB magnet supply-chain assessment, quantifying concentration risks and substitution difficulty.
2018
United States · US Department of the Interior
Federal recognition of Mo supply risk. Triggers priority review of mining permits and supply chain assessments for domestic Mo operations.
2018
United States · US Department of the Interior
Formal recognition of niobium's strategic importance and 100% US import dependence. Triggers inclusion in defense stockpile reviews.
2017
United States · US OSHA
Permissible exposure limit reduced tenfold from 2.0 μg/m³ to 0.2 μg/m³. Phased compliance imposed significant capital costs, discouraging new entrants.
2016
United States · US EPA
Chronic exposure limits set at 4.6 ug/L (lentic) and 6.5 ug/L (lotic). Increased compliance costs for miners and refiners.
2011
United States · European Parliament
CdTe panels exempted from cadmium restrictions because Cd is hermetically sealed and proven recycling pathways exist. Exemption remains in force; political consensus favors maintaining it for decarbonization.
Jul 2010
United States · US Congress
Requires SEC-registered companies to disclose 3TG sourcing from DRC and 9 surrounding countries. Annual Form SD filings mandatory. Compliance costs $100K-$1M+ per large company. ~6,000-8,000 companies covered.
Jul 2010
United States · US Congress / SEC
US-listed companies must report on DRC-origin tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold. Drives adoption of ITSCI certification and supply chain traceability for DRC cassiterite.
2005
United States · US DoD / Materion Corporation
Federal funding for construction of Elmore, Ohio refinery to restore domestic high-purity beryllium metal production capability lost in 2000.
Ongoing
European Union · USGS & European Commission
Classified as critical due to high economic importance and extreme supply risk, triggering mapping and strategic funding.
Mid-2000s
United States · US Department of Defense
Formal recognition of defense dependency on beryllium. Triggers public-private partnership investments under Defense Production Act Title III.
Chokepoints and concentration notes
Beryllium: Three-country refining monopoly: US, China, Kazakhstan — no alternatives exist
Beryllium: US NDS stockpile critically depleted: 2.61 t vs 45 t goal
Gallium: Export licensing (Aug 2023) + US ban (Dec 2024)
Gallium: 100% US import dependency (USGS)
Germanium: US has zero primary refining capacity
Niobium: US 100% import-dependent; EU 92% sourced from Brazil
Selenium: US imports >75% of consumption (Philippines, Mexico, Germany, Canada, Poland)
Tantalum: US strategic reserves depleted to <100 tonnes (down from 3,000 tonnes in 1990s)
Tin: US 74% import-dependent with negligible domestic mine production
Vanadium: US holds zero strategic vanadium reserves in National Defense Stockpile
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