The Pentagon Becomes a Shareholder: Equity as Industrial Policy in Critical Minerals and Missile Propulsion

Executive Summary

Over the past 18 months, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has shifted from a traditional buyer-supplier model toward direct equity and equity-like stakes in critical minerals and weapons manufacturers, committing approximately $9.5 billion across at least six major transactions, alongside a $9 billion expansion of Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III authority for broader industrial base investment [1][8][25]. This marks a structural pivot in U.S. industrial policy at the intersection of defense, critical minerals, and capital markets.

Flagship moves include an estimated $400 million equity-led package into MP Materials to scale U.S. rare earth magnet capacity [1][5], a $1.6 billion Commerce/DoD-backed package for USA Rare Earth combining a $1.3 billion senior secured loan with equity and warrants [1], and a $1 billion convertible preferred investment in L3Harris’s Missile Solutions business that will convert into common equity at a planned H2 2026 IPO, making DoD the anchor investor [2][9]. Parallel deals with Vulcan Elements/ReElement, Trilogy Metals, and Korea Zinc extend this model into recycling, copper, and other critical materials [8][12][13][20].

These interventions seek to counter China’s ~95% control of heavy rare earth output and the U.S. dependence on China for ~90% of its heavy rare earth imports [6], but they also embed the Pentagon deeply in corporate governance, capital structure, and long-term project risk. For defense OEMs, miners, and investors, the core question is no longer whether the state will back domestic supply chains, but on what terms and with what strategic and governance consequences.

Immediate actions (next 30 days)

• Map exposure: Identify portfolio, JV, and supply-chain links to DoD-backed assets (MP Materials, USA Rare Earth, Vulcan/ReElement, Trilogy, L3Harris Missile Solutions) and flag governance interfaces where DoD is or could become a material shareholder [1][2][5][12][13][20].
• Stress-test procurement strategies: For defense primes, model scenarios where DoD equity ownership influences source approval, volume allocations, and pricing in magnets, heavy rare earths, and solid rocket motors [2][5][6][11].
• Engage early with Office of Strategic Capital (OSC): Mining and processing developers should align project milestones and financing structure to OSC/DPA Section 303 criteria before DPA Title III solicitations close in the current budget cycle [1][8][25].

Risk / Impact / Timing

• Risk level: High – structural shift in state-industry relations, concentrated in few critical assets [1][5][6][8].
• Impact: Multi‑billion‑dollar distortions in capital allocation; potential single‑asset dependencies in magnets and propulsion >$5 billion program exposure per major platform cluster [2][5][6].
• Crisis timing: 2026–2030 – coinciding with H2 2026 L3Harris Missile Solutions IPO, MP/USA Rare Earth hydromet and magnet commissioning, and potential further Chinese export control moves [1][2][5][9][11].

The Problem

At the core of the Pentagon’s equity turn lies a hard constraint: the U.S. warfighting ecosystem depends on critical minerals and components largely controlled by geostrategic competitors. As of 2024, the United States was 100% net-import reliant for 12 critical minerals and at least 50% reliant for 29 more [10][24]. For heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium-indispensable for high‑performance permanent magnets in fighter aircraft, missiles, radar, and naval propulsion-China controls around 95% of global output, and roughly 90% of U.S. heavy rare earth imports come from China [6].

While the U.S. is the world’s second‑largest producer of unprocessed rare earth oxides, it has historically lacked domestic processing and magnet manufacturing, forcing U.S. producers to export oxides to foreign refiners-predominantly in China—and reimport finished materials [10]. This structural weakness was weaponized in 2025 when Beijing imposed export controls on 12 rare earth elements and related technologies with direct application to permanent magnets and defense systems [11]. Subsequent trade data indicated that, even after a limited one‑year “truce” announced in mid‑2025, China restored exports of finished magnets but kept upstream rare earth metals and compounds below pre‑control baselines, underscoring its enduring leverage [11].

Traditional defense procurement tools—multi‑year purchase contracts and marginal capacity payments—have proven insufficient to change this risk calculus. Capital‑intensive rare earth separation, hydrometallurgy, and magnet plants face long lead times, technology risk, and the threat of Chinese price suppression. Without visible state risk‑sharing, private capital remained reluctant to fund U.S. projects at the necessary scale and speed [1][5][8][12].

From the Pentagon’s perspective, the result was an industrial base that could not be reshored by “writing bigger purchase orders” alone. The response has been to deploy DPA Section 303 and Industrial Base Assessment and Sustainment (IBAS) authorities in new ways, using the Office of Strategic Capital to structure loans, convertible preferred securities, warrants, and long‑term offtake and price‑floor commitments [1][5][8][12][25]. This transforms the DoD from a purchaser into a shareholder and co‑financier, embedding it in the capital stack of mines, refineries, and weapon‑system OEMs.

For operators and investors, the problem is two‑sided. On one hand, equity participation may be the only credible path to build magnet, hydrometallurgy, and propulsion capacity outside China within this decade. On the other, it creates new governance and execution risks: concentration of state support in a handful of firms; potential misalignment between national‑security objectives and minority shareholders; politicization of capital allocation; and the possibility that over‑reliance on a small portfolio of DoD‑backed assets simply re‑creates a different version of single‑source dependence.

Current State

The shift toward equity has unfolded through a compressed series of policy moves and transaction announcements since early 2025. Below we outline the key milestones and their implications for critical minerals and defense production.

Policy and Authority Build‑out (2025)

March 2025 – Executive Order on Minerals. A presidential order on “Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production” directed agencies to identify mineral projects for expedited permitting, coordinate loans and capital assistance, and explicitly instructed the DoD and Department of Energy to develop a plan for a Defense Finance Corporation to create a dedicated fund for domestic mineral investments under DPA authority [25]. This provided direct presidential cover for equity and quasi‑equity tools in mining and processing.

April 2025 – Acquisition Modernization Order. A follow‑on executive order on “Modernizing Defense Acquisitions and Spurring Innovation in the Defense Industrial Base” adopted a more flexible toolkit: expanded Other Transactions Authority, rapid capabilities mechanisms, and direct lending or investment pathways outside the traditional Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) model [26]. The order framed private‑capital crowd‑in as a priority, foreshadowing OSC’s later structures combining loans, equity, and demand guarantees [1][8].

April & October 2025 – Chinese Export Controls. In parallel, Beijing imposed and then escalated export controls on 12 rare earth elements and related processing technologies with direct defense applications, including dysprosium, terbium, and several others critical to permanent magnets [11]. Even after a limited mid‑2025 easing, exports of rare earth metals and compounds remained depressed, while finished magnet exports normalized, reinforcing China’s ability to set terms in upstream segments [11]. These moves hardened views in Washington that reshoring required more than offtake contracts—it required ownership and governance influence.

Late 2025 – Acquisition Transformation Strategy. In November 2025, the Department released an Acquisition Transformation Strategy that formally endorsed “public‑private partnerships” with “stable demand signals and the correct incentives” and explicit “risk sharing with industry” via enhanced Department participation in governance and returns structures [8]. The document called for collaboration with private equity and venture capital, and instituted “routine monitoring of performance against milestones” and commercialization progress for supported firms [8]. This institutionalized the equity playbook that had been developing ad hoc.

From Buyer to Investor: Transaction Wave (Late 2025 – Early 2026)

MP Materials – “Mine to Magnet” Backbone. In December 2025, MP Materials announced a “transformational public‑private partnership” with the DoD involving a multi‑billion‑dollar package of convertible preferred equity, warrants, loans, and price‑floor and offtake commitments running more than a decade [5]. MP’s Mountain Pass mine in California supplies over 10% of global rare earth oxides and is one of the only non‑Chinese rare earth ore producers in operation [19]. The deal positions DoD as MP’s largest shareholder and underwrites construction of a second U.S. magnet plant—dubbed the “10X Facility”—to bring total company magnet capacity to roughly 10,000 t per year by around 2028 [5]. Industry reporting places DoD’s equity component near $400 million, though exact figures are not publicly disclosed [1][5].

Vulcan Elements & ReElement – Scale‑up from Pilot to Mass Production. Around the same window, Vulcan Elements announced a $1.4 billion strategic partnership with the U.S. Government and ReElement Technologies [12][20]. The Department committed a $620 million direct loan for Vulcan’s magnet facility expansion, plus $80 million for ReElement’s recycling and processing capacity, while the Department of Commerce took $50 million in equity stakes; warrants to DoD added further upside [12][20]. Vulcan currently operates a ~10 t per year magnet facility in Durham, North Carolina and plans to scale to 10,000 t annually through the new plant [20]. The deal leverages an earlier offtake agreement between Vulcan and ReElement for light and heavy rare earth oxides [12].

USA Rare Earth – Hydrometallurgy and Heavy REEs. In January 2026, USA Rare Earth announced a non‑binding letter of intent from the Commerce Department’s CHIPS Program for a proposed $1.6 billion package: a $1.3 billion senior secured loan and $277 million in federal funding, in exchange for 16.1 million shares and roughly 17.6 million warrants [1]. The financing is keyed to operation of a hydromet demonstration plant in Colorado in early 2026, running five solvent‑extraction circuits for 2,000–4,000 hours targeting heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium [1]. Successful demonstration is required to accelerate commercial production into late 2028, compressing timelines by roughly two years versus earlier plans [1].

Trilogy Metals – Direct Equity and Governance Rights. Also in late 2025, Trilogy Metals secured a $35.6 million DoD investment structured as direct equity: $17.8 million for 8,215,570 units (each one share plus three‑quarters of a 10‑year warrant), giving DoD approximately 10% ownership and the right to appoint a director for three years [13]. The warrants, priced at $0.01 per share, are exercisable only if the Ambler Road access project is completed, directly linking equity upside to project execution [13].

L3Harris Missile Solutions – Propulsion as a Financial Asset. In January 2026, the Pentagon announced a $1 billion convertible preferred investment in L3Harris Technologies’ Missile Solutions business [2][9]. Missile Solutions, built on L3Harris’s 2023 acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne, is a key supplier of solid rocket motors for systems such as PAC‑3, THAAD, Tomahawk, and Standard Missile [2][36]. The security automatically converts into common equity upon a planned H2 2026 IPO of Missile Solutions, making DoD the anchor investor and largest shareholder while L3Harris retains control [2][9]. Proceeds are earmarked for capacity expansion, facility modernization, and throughput increases on backlogged missile programs, and are paired with multi‑year procurement arrangements to provide demand certainty [2].

Portfolio Scope. Taken together, these and related transactions across MP Materials, USA Rare Earth, Vulcan/ReElement, Trilogy Metals, Korea Zinc, and L3Harris Missile Solutions amount to at least six equity or equity‑convertible deals totaling roughly $9.5 billion as of early 2026 [1][8]. A separate $9 billion expansion of DPA Title III authorities further enlarges the pool available for future equity‑like interventions [25]. The state is now a central capital provider, not just a customer.

Governance and Contracting Overlay (2026)

In January 2026, a new executive order titled “Prioritizing the Warfighter in Defense Contracting” directed DoD to incorporate performance triggers into future contracts, including restrictions on stock buybacks, dividends, and CEO compensation above $5 million during periods of under‑performance, non‑compliance, or insufficient production [3]. This reinforced the message that for mission‑critical suppliers—many now with DoD on the cap table—corporate governance and capital allocation are under closer scrutiny.

By March 2026, all major defense primes had raised 2026 capital expenditure guidance, several significantly so, a move contemporaneous with the new order’s implementation [3]. While causality is complex, the pattern suggests investors expect both higher demand and more active Pentagon involvement in investment decisions, especially where OSC and DPA funding are present.

Key Data & Trends

The emerging Pentagon equity portfolio is concentrated, strategic, and designed to close specific bottlenecks. Below we highlight quantitative patterns relevant for capital allocation and supply‑chain planning.

1. Federal Capital Concentration in a Few Critical Nodes

Federal equity and loan commitments are clustering in a small set of firms at the heart of rare earth magnets and missile propulsion [1][2][5][12][13][20].

Illustrative distribution of major DoD/Commerce commitments by company:

This concentration underscores why counterparties need detailed visibility into which suppliers have implicit or explicit government backstops. It also highlights crowding‑risk: private capital may be pulled toward DoD‑favored platforms, leaving other prospective projects capital constrained even if they are technically viable.

2. China’s Dominance in Heavy Rare Earths

DoD’s equity push is fundamentally a response to the scale of Chinese dominance in heavy rare earths [6].

With China controlling ~95% of global heavy rare earth output and supplying ~90% of U.S. heavy rare earth imports [6], any export restriction reverberates immediately through U.S. defense programs. The scale of this asymmetry explains why Washington is prepared to accept higher costs, increased state ownership, and governance entanglements to establish even partial domestic capacity.

3. U.S. Magnet Capacity: From Near‑Zero to Tens of Thousands of Tonnes

Domestic permanent magnet capacity is set for an order‑of‑magnitude expansion this decade if announced projects deliver [5][20].

Vulcan aims to move from a 10 tonne pilot to 10,000 tonnes annually; MP Materials’ 10X plan brings its U.S. magnet output toward a similar scale [5][20]. Even combined, this remains only a portion of total U.S. demand, but from a strategic perspective it creates a domestic floor of supply that cannot be sanctioned away. For OEMs, the key question is how much of this capacity will be reserved for defense versus commercial uses, and under what pricing structures.

4. From Capacity Payments to Equity and Convertible Structures

Transaction structures show a consistent pattern: blending senior debt with equity or equity‑linked instruments and long‑term offtake / price‑floor commitments [1][2][5][12][13]. USA Rare Earth’s package anchors a secured loan with shares and warrants; MP’s deal layers convertible preferred, warrants, and floor‑price offtake; Trilogy’s structure hard‑wires warrant value to project completion [1][5][13].

For procurement and finance teams, the “so what” is clear: government‑backed suppliers may have lower cost of capital and different risk appetites than peers. This can affect bidding behavior, willingness to invest ahead of contracts, and resilience under price pressure, reshaping competitive dynamics across mining, refining, and components.

5. Rapid Scaling of DPA/OSC Financial Deployment

The cumulative effect of the past 18 months is a step‑change in how much capital DoD deploys through financial channels rather than pure contracting [1][8][25].

Between at least $9.5 billion in specific equity or equity‑convertible deals and a $9 billion DPA Title III expansion, total potential deployable capital exceeds $18 billion [1][8][25]. While not all of this will be drawn, the signal matters: for critical minerals developers and OEMs, alignment with DoD strategic priorities can now unlock quasi‑sovereign financing far beyond traditional cost‑sharing grants.

Risks & Scenarios

The Pentagon’s equity turn introduces a new risk landscape for defense and critical minerals stakeholders. Below we outline three scenarios with indicative probabilities and implications.

Scenario 1 – Managed Expansion (Base Case, ~60%)

Outline. DoD and partner agencies continue to deploy OSC and DPA authorities along the current trajectory. MP’s 10X facility, Vulcan’s expansion, and USA Rare Earth’s hydromet line reach mechanical completion broadly on schedule (2028±1 year) [1][5][20]. The L3Harris Missile Solutions IPO goes ahead in H2 2026 with DoD as a large but non‑controlling shareholder [2][9]. China maintains but does not dramatically escalate export controls [11].

Risks. Execution risk remains high: hydrometallurgy scale‑up failures, permitting delays (e.g., Ambler Road for Trilogy [13]), and cost overruns could force additional state capital or painful restructurings. Governance tensions may surface as DoD appointees push for mission‑driven decisions (e.g., prioritizing defense offtake at lower margins) that conflict with minority shareholders’ expectations. Yet systemic disruption is limited; procurement managers can rely on a growing, albeit still thin, domestic supplier base.

Implications. In this world, being inside the DoD equity “tent” is a durable advantage. Non‑backed projects face tougher capital markets and may become acquisition targets or adjuncts to the main DoD‑favored platforms. Price formation in magnets and certain missile systems will partially internalize state risk‑sharing—leading to more predictable but potentially structurally higher cost curves.

Scenario 2 – Stress and Politicization (Escalation, ~25%)

Outline. One or more major projects in the Pentagon portfolio misses technical or schedule milestones: hydromet demonstration underperforms at USA Rare Earth [1], magnet throughput at Vulcan lags nameplate [20], or L3Harris’s Missile Solutions faces IPO market pushback, delaying conversion of DoD’s preferred stake [2][9]. In parallel, Beijing tightens export controls further or introduces informal administrative barriers that squeeze non‑Chinese refiners [11]. Domestic political scrutiny of “industrial policy by equity stake” intensifies.

Risks. DoD is forced into visible capital calls, restructurings, or even de‑facto nationalizations of critical assets to preserve capacity, blurring the line between shareholder and regulator. Congressional oversight could respond with restrictive riders, slowing or freezing further OSC deployments. Private investors, seeing heightened political risk and uncertain exit pathways, price in higher required returns or shift capital elsewhere. Supply‑chain planners may face renewed fragility if a few over‑concentrated projects stumble.

Implications. This scenario amplifies governance risk. Counterparties to DoD‑backed firms must plan for scenarios where government priorities override commercial logic, including forced allocation of output to specific programs or price interventions. For firms outside the portfolio, opportunities may open to position as “politically neutral” alternatives—but without matching access to cheap capital.

Scenario 3 – Diversification and Normalization (Relief, ~15%)

Outline. Technological and market developments diffuse risk: successful hydromet processes at USA Rare Earth [1] and Trilogy’s project [13] are replicated by additional developers; allied producers in Europe and Asia expand capacity; recycling (e.g., ReElement) scales more rapidly than expected [12][20]. China adopts a more pragmatic posture, keeping export controls in place but administering them less aggressively [11]. Politically, a cross‑party consensus emerges favoring time‑limited, performance‑linked state equity stakes that sunset as projects mature.

Risks. The main risk here is complacency: policymakers could misread an improved short‑term supply picture as structural security and prematurely unwind support before a diverse supplier base is fully established. Private investors may demand clearer signals on state exit timelines before recommitting capital to the sector.

Implications. Equity stakes begin to look more like catalytic bridge financing than permanent governance arrangements. For operators, this would mean greater emphasis on meeting performance milestones that trigger state exit and a gradual reversion to more conventional supplier–buyer relationships. However, given the time horizons of mining and processing, any such normalization is unlikely before the early 2030s.

Risk Matrix (Qualitative)

• Supply security risk: High now; moderate in Scenario 1; spikes in Scenario 2; moderates in Scenario 3.
• Governance/political risk: Structural and rising under all scenarios, highest in Scenario 2.
• Timing: Key inflection points 2026–2029: L3Harris Missile Solutions IPO (2026) [2][9], hydromet commercialization (2028) [1], magnet plant ramp‑ups (2028–2029) [5][20].

Actionable Intelligence

The Pentagon’s equity play changes how defense suppliers, miners, and investors should plan. Below are concrete actions by time horizon.

Do Now (Next 4–6 Weeks)

• Map portfolio and supply‑chain touchpoints.
  • Owner: Strategy / Supply Chain leads.
  • Action: Build an internal registry of exposure to MP Materials, USA Rare Earth, Vulcan/ReElement, Trilogy Metals, Korea Zinc, and L3Harris Missile Solutions—both as suppliers and as JV/portfolio positions [1][2][5][12][13][20]. Flag where DoD equity or board representation is present.
• Review contract and governance clauses.
  • Owner: Legal / Contracts.
  • Action: For entities dealing with DoD‑backed firms, review change‑of‑control, state‑aid, and information‑sharing clauses. Where DoD has board rights (e.g., Trilogy [13]) or is expected to become a major shareholder (MP, L3Harris Missile Solutions [2][5][9]), assess whether contractual protections need updating.
• Integrate OSC/DPA criteria into project design.
  • Owner: Mining and processing project developers.
  • Action: Align feasibility studies and investment cases with DPA Section 303 and OSC’s stated criteria: contribution to national security, technology readiness, co‑investment from private capital, and clear commercialization milestones [1][8][25]. Position projects for upcoming DPA Title III solicitations.

Do in the Next 2–3 Quarters

• Scenario‑plan DoD as shareholder across tiers.
  • Owner: CFO / Corporate Development.
  • Action: For primes and major subsystem suppliers, model how DoD ownership in key upstream nodes (magnets, motors) could influence pricing, volume allocation, and technology roadmaps. Consider both favorable (stable offtake) and adverse (priority allocation away from you) scenarios.
• Explore co‑investment or partnership structures.
  • Owner: Strategy / Business Development.
  • Action: For investors and industrials, evaluate minority positions alongside DoD/OSC in magnet, hydromet, or recycling projects, treating the state as an anchor LP. Focus on structures where governance rights and exit pathways are clearly defined to avoid being subordinated to non‑commercial priorities.
• Re‑assess sourcing diversification strategy.
  • Owner: Supply Chain / Procurement.
  • Action: Rebalance sourcing matrices to include both DoD‑backed and independent suppliers where technically feasible. For critical inputs like high‑coercivity magnets and heavy rare earth oxides, identify at least one non‑DoD‑backed alternative per component if available, to mitigate concentration risk.

Positioning for 2026–2030

• Design capital structure for policy durability.
  • Owner: CEOs / Boards of mining and processing firms.
  • Action: Structure future financings so that state equity stakes are either clearly time‑bounded or paired with sunset / buy‑back mechanisms tied to performance milestones. This mitigates the risk of permanent politicization and may make projects more attractive to institutional investors.
• Build technology options beyond current DoD bets.
  • Owner: CTO / R&D.
  • Action: Invest in alternative technologies that could de‑risk current dependencies: magnet chemistries with reduced dysprosium/terbium content, motor designs less reliant on rare earths, or improved recycling yields [1][6][12][20]. Position to benefit if policy shifts away from today’s chosen assets or if those assets underperform.
• Institutionalize political‑risk and governance monitoring.
  • Owner: Risk / Government Affairs.
  • Action: Treat DoD equity involvement as an ongoing political‑risk exposure. Establish regular reviews of executive orders, DPA/OSC guidance, and congressional oversight trends [3][8][25][26]. Integrate these into capital allocation and M&A decisions, particularly for assets in the Pentagon’s orbit.

Signals to Watch

Monitoring a few concrete indicators can provide early warning of shifts in the Pentagon’s equity strategy and its impact on critical minerals and defense supply chains.

• L3Harris Missile Solutions IPO timing and structure.
  • Signal: Confirmation, delay, or downsizing of the planned H2 2026 IPO and any changes in DoD’s conversion terms [2][9].
  • Why it matters: A bellwether for investor appetite for DoD‑backed equity stories and for the durability of the convertible‑preferred model.
• USA Rare Earth hydromet demonstration performance.
  • Signal: Public reporting on runtime hours achieved, throughput, and separation efficiencies at the Colorado demonstration facility [1].
  • Why it matters: Underpins the feasibility of U.S. heavy rare earth separation; under‑performance would ripple through supply plans and financing.
• Progress on key enabling infrastructure (e.g., Ambler Road).
  • Signal: Regulatory and legal milestones on projects linked to Trilogy Metals’ assets [13].
  • Why it matters: Trilogy’s warrant structure only pays off if Ambler Road is completed, making it a test case for how DoD handles contingent equity tied to politically contentious infrastructure.
• Chinese export control adjustments.
  • Signal: New or modified controls on rare earth elements, processing technologies, or magnet exports from China [11].
  • Why it matters: Any tightening will validate the Pentagon’s reshoring strategy and could trigger accelerated or expanded equity interventions.
• DPA Title III and OSC solicitation cadence.
  • Signal: Frequency, size, and sector focus of new solicitations or awards under DPA Section 303 and OSC programs [8][25].
  • Why it matters: Indicates whether the current equity push will broaden beyond today’s portfolio or consolidate around existing champions.

Sources

[1] Public disclosures and company statements regarding USA Rare Earth CHIPS Program letter of intent and associated federal financing package.

[2] Department of Defense and L3Harris announcements detailing the $1 billion convertible preferred investment in Missile Solutions and planned IPO structure.

[3] Executive order “Prioritizing the Warfighter in Defense Contracting” and subsequent reporting on defense prime capital expenditure guidance.

[5] MP Materials corporate communications on the “transformational” public‑private partnership with DoD, including financing structure and 10X magnet facility plans.

[6] Assistant Secretary of War testimony on Chinese control of heavy rare earth output and U.S. import dependence.

[8] Department of Defense Acquisition Transformation Strategy and related Office of Strategic Capital materials describing investment frameworks and monitoring protocols.

[9] Investor presentations and filings outlining the L3Harris Missile Solutions spinoff, DoD’s anchor investor role, and H2 2026 IPO timing.

[10] U.S. government assessments quantifying net‑import reliance for critical minerals.

[11] Chinese government notices and trade data analyses on 2025 export controls covering rare earth elements, processing technologies, and related products.

[12] Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies announcements on the strategic partnership with DoD and Department of Commerce, including loan and warrant terms.

[13] Trilogy Metals news releases and filings on the $35.6 million DoD equity investment, warrant terms, and board appointment rights.

[16] MP Materials location announcement for the 10X magnet facility in Northlake, Texas, including planned investment and employment figures.

[19] MP Materials disclosures on Mountain Pass mine production and share of global rare earth oxide supply.

[20] Vulcan Elements materials describing current and planned magnet production capacities at the Durham facility and expansion project.

[24] U.S. geological and critical minerals strategy documents on import dependence across key commodities.

[25] Executive order on “Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production” and documentation of the $9 billion Defense Production Act Title III expansion.

[26] Executive order on “Modernizing Defense Acquisitions and Spurring Innovation in the Defense Industrial Base.”

[36] L3Harris corporate filings and press releases related to the 2023 acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne and integration into Missile Solutions.