Case Study

Ford’s 2025 Explorer production halt exposed how rare earth magnets, dysprosium, and terbium can turn a minerals constraint into an automotive shutdown.

Albemarle’s Kemerton shutdown shows why Western lithium hydroxide refining remains structurally exposed to Chinese cost, scale, and demand advantages.

GaN vs SiC by voltage class (Aug 2026): SiC for 800–1200 V traction, solar and grid; GaN for ≤700 V chargers, server PSUs and 800 VDC racks — plus the gallium risk: China ~99%, 8–10× price gap, Nov 27 cliff.

A few percent of dysprosium and terbium keep NdFeB magnets from losing half their coercivity at 150 °C — and sit at the supply chain’s weakest point.

Gallium is 90%+ Chinese and SiC boules grow one slow wafer at a time: here is where the wide-bandgap chip supply chain actually breaks, mine to module.

Bench yields above 90% for gallium, germanium and rare earths fall to 70-80% at pilot scale. Impurities and solvent extraction, not geology, set the limit.

Lynas and MP Materials anchor 25-33% of non-Chinese rare earth supply in 2026, but a 10,000-tonne NdPr deficit keeps the whole system dangerously brittle.

Battery recycling capacity grew ~50% in 2023, but lithium recovery stalls at 40-60% and scrap lags. Mining stays dominant for strategic metals to 2030.