Country Intelligence
China stands out in this dataset through named industrial and corporate presence, policy leverage over trade and investment, and upstream production exposure, with its strongest relevance showing up in Gallium, Graphite, and Terbium.
This country stands out through downstream industrial presence, named companies, and end-market relevance rather than pure upstream concentration.
Strategic Read
China matters because upstream supply concentration still drives pricing power, availability, and procurement risk across multiple materials.
Policy events
34
Materials covered
20
Leading materials
China: what is controlled, what is paused, and until when
As of August 2026, China still licenses every export of the seven medium and heavy rare earths controlled since April 2025 (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, yttrium and magnets containing them), plus gallium, germanium, antimony, graphite, tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium — and it refines about 85% of the world's rare earths (IEA, 2025 data), makes about 94% of sintered NdFeB magnets and produces about 98% of primary gallium.
Two broader packages are only paused: the October 2025 rules (five more rare earths, the 0.1%-by-value foreign-product rule, rare-earth technology, battery and anode items) are suspended until November 10, 2026, and the US-specific gallium/germanium/antimony ban until November 27, 2026. Neither has been extended. Beijing has meanwhile added company-specific bans (MP Materials and USA Rare Earth on June 22; 14 EU entities including Rheinmetall on July 24), a whistleblower enforcement system (in force July 1) and a new strategic-minerals regulation (State Council Order 839, in force June 15). The next leaders' window is Xi Jinping's planned September 24, 2026 US visit.
Control regimes — status as of August 16, 2026
| Regime | Status | Last change |
|---|---|---|
| April 2025 seven REEs (Sm, Gd, Tb, Dy, Lu, Sc, Y + oxides, alloys, magnets) — MOFCOM/GACC Announcement No. 18 tracker row → | ACTIVE — case-by-case licensing; never included in the November 2025 suspension. Year-long general licences issued to some Chinese exporters since December 2025; US access still difficult (AmCham, June 2026); zero Dy/Tb/Y shipped to Japan in June 2026. | 2025-12 (general licences); May 2026 summit produced no relaxation |
| October 2025 package — Announcements 55–58, 61, 62 (Er, Ho, Tm, Eu, Yb; 0.1%-by-value extraterritorial rule; REE mining/separation/magnet/recycling technology; Li-battery and synthetic-graphite anode items; superhard materials) tracker row → | SUSPENDED until November 10, 2026 (Announcement No. 70 of 2025-11-07). No extension announced; MOFCOM said in April 2026 that any post-November arrangement is subject to US–China consultation. | 2025-11-07 |
| US-specific 'in principle' ban on gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials (Announcement No. 46 of 2024-12-03) + stricter US end-use review for graphite tracker row → | SUSPENDED until November 27, 2026 (Announcement No. 72 of 2025-11-09). Worldwide dual-use licensing (Ga/Ge since Aug 2023; Sb since Sept 2024) and the ban on exports to US military end-users remain ACTIVE. | 2025-11-09 |
| Graphite (natural flake, spherical, high-purity, anode) — December 2023 licensing tracker row → | ACTIVE licensing. The October 2025 expansion is suspended to November 10; the US-specific stricter review to November 27. | 2025-11 |
| Tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum, indium — Announcement No. 10 of 2025-02-04 tracker row → | ACTIVE; not part of any suspension. Tungsten, antimony and silver additionally run through state-trading exporter catalogues (15 W / 11 Sb / 44 Ag exporters for 2026–27, published 2025-12-26). | 2025-12-26 (catalogue) |
| Japan-specific: Announcement No. 1 of 2026-01-06 (all dual-use items banned for Japanese military end-use), Feb 24 restricted list of 20 + watch list of 20 | ACTIVE; heavy-REE and gallium flows to Japan near zero for months (June 2026: zero Ga/Dy/Tb/Y). | 2026-02-24; further listings 2026-07-07 |
| Entity-specific bans (2026) | 10 US entities incl. MP Materials and USA Rare Earth (Announcement 23, 2026-06-22); 14 EU entities incl. Rheinmetall (Announcement 30, 2026-07-24); 7 US entities + drone controls (Announcement 34, 2026-08-05). | 2026-08-05 |
| Enforcement — Announcement No. 26 reporting/whistleblower system; State Council Order No. 839 (Mineral Resources Law implementing regulations) | IN FORCE since July 1, 2026 (No. 26; at least 11 companies penalised in 2026 per Caixin) and June 15, 2026 (Order 839: three-layer strategic reserve system, emergency requisition, Article 76 countermeasures). | 2026-07-01 |
Key numbers
| Metric | Value | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rare-earth mine production (China / world) | 270,000 t REO of 390,000 t (~69%); reserves 44 Mt | 2026-02 | [12] |
| Share of refined rare-earth output | 85% (2025), down from >90% (2023) | 2026-07-16 | [11] |
| Share of sintered NdFeB magnets | ~94% (2024) | 2025 | [11] |
| Primary gallium / refined germanium / refined tellurium | 98% / 77% / 77% | 2026-06-12 | [13] |
| Mined tungsten / refined bismuth / refined indium / mined natural graphite | 83% / 82% / 68% / 79% (battery-grade graphite processing >90%) | 2026-06-12 | [13] |
| Antimony mine share | ~36% of 2025 output (40 kt of 110 kt, USGS MCS 2026); older USGS series 59% — always label the year | 2026-02 | [12] |
| Rare-earth exports Jan–Jul 2026 | 34,706 t (−10% y/y); July 4,223.5 t | 2026-08-07 | [14] |
| Magnet exports to the US, H1 2026 | avg 479 t/month vs 586 t/month in 2022–24 (~−20%) | 2026-07-20 | [9] |
| Downstream production at risk if Oct-2025 controls fully enforced | ~US$6.5 tn/yr outside China; +US$300bn graphite | 2026-07-16 | [10] |
Dated developments since the previous review
What to do now, by role
| If you are… | Exposure | What to do now | Watch date |
|---|---|---|---|
| US/EU magnet or motor buyer (autos, HVAC, robotics) | Dy/Tb-bearing NdFeB grades need a MOFCOM licence today; the 0.1% rule would pull foreign-made assemblies into licensing after Nov 10 | Audit BOM for Dy/Tb content; qualify low-heavy-REE grades; get supplier general-licence status in writing; pre-book Q4 deliveries | Sept 24 (Xi visit) → Nov 10, 2026 |
| US defense contractor or DoD sub-tier supplier | Military end-use is presumptively denied under every regime; DFARS waivers end Jan 1, 2027 | Map covered-country content in magnets, W, Ta, Mo now; file transition plans; qualify MP / USA Rare Earth / Lynas / Noveon supply | Jan 1, 2027 |
| Semiconductor / RF / optics maker using Ga, Ge, In | Worldwide licensing active; US-specific 'in principle' ban returns Nov 27 unless extended; ex-China gallium premium already 8–10× | Build 6–9 months of Ga/Ge inventory; qualify Nyrstar / Umicore / Teck / Rio Tinto / Alcoa streams; register with Project Vault OEM commitments | Nov 27, 2026 |
| Japanese OEM or its tier-1s | Effectively zero Ga/Dy/Tb/Y from China since January 2026; restricted and watch lists (Subaru etc.) | Route heavy REEs via Lynas Malaysia / JOGMEC; expect licence reviews to stay frozen | Any Japan–China thaw; monthly GACC data (~20th) |
| European industrial (not on the 14-entity list) | Civilian licences granted but slow; retaliation risk tied to EU sanctions rounds | Apply via the Chinese exporter for a general licence; join EU joint-stockpile (W/REE/Ga) working groups | EU sanctions packages; RESourceEU stockpile decision |
| Junior miner or ex-China refiner | China price ~US$110/kg NdPr vs allied reference/floor prices; entity-listing of MP and USA Rare Earth shows Beijing will target competitors | Position for S&P reference-price floors (Ga, Ge, W, Sb, NdPr), Project Vault offtake, EU/G7 stockpile tenders | Aug–Sept US price-floor agreements; Nov 10 snap-back = repricing |
| Battery or anode maker | Natural and synthetic graphite licensing active; October-2025 anode and Li-battery technology controls return Nov 10 unless extended | Secure non-China anode (Syrah / Vianode / Novonix) qualification; stockpile CSPG | Nov 10, 2026 |
| Compliance / trade counsel | Whistleblower system (Announcement 26) and Order 839 raise transshipment and aiding liability worldwide | Update end-use certificates; screen for Announcement 23/30/34 entities; document non-China origin | Ongoing |
Commonly misstated
Go deeper on Materials Dispatch
Primary and authoritative references (23)
Editorial rule: every status statement above is dated and traceable to a listed source; where sources disagree (e.g. antimony shares by year), the discrepancy is stated rather than averaged. Brief last reviewed August 16, 2026.
Why China matters
Primary read
Industrial base
Why it matters
China matters because upstream supply concentration still drives pricing power, availability, and procurement risk across multiple materials.
What to watch
Watch policy changes, permitting, and trade rules alongside any shift in Gallium exposure.
Coverage signals
Materials covered
20
Linked policy events
34
Refining appearances
17
Named companies
37
These are dataset signals showing how often China appears across strategic materials research, not official reserve or production totals.
Mining / upstream supply
Very High
18
Refining / processing
Very High
17
Policy leverage
Very High
34
Industrial presence
Very High
37
Where China appears in the dataset
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Gallium matters here because of producer signal: 99% (primary low-purity), refining share: 99%, 2 named players, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
99% (primary low-purity)
Refining share
99%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Graphite matters here because of producer signal: 77% (1,230,000 tonnes), refining share: 92%, 3 named players, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
77% (1,230,000 tonnes)
Refining share
92%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Terbium matters here because of producer signal: ~90% (separation and refining), refining share: 90%, 5 named players, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
~90% (separation and refining)
Refining share
90%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Dysprosium matters here because of producer signal: 85-90% (refining/separation), refining share: 90%, 4 named players, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
85-90% (refining/separation)
Refining share
90%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Neodymium matters here because of producer signal: 58% mining, 92% magnets (2020), refining share: 90%, and 5 named players.
Producer signal
58% mining, 92% magnets (2020)
Refining share
90%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Germanium matters here because of producer signal: 80-85% (Yunnan Chihong: 60 t/yr capacity), refining share: 83% (~1,040), 1 named player, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
80-85% (Yunnan Chihong: 60 t/yr capacity)
Refining share
83% · ~1,040
Processing and refining relevance
Cobalt matters here because of refining share: 73% (170,910), 5 named players, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Refining share
73% · 170,910
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Indium matters here because of producer signal: 55–65% (~760 t in 2025), refining share: 60%, 2 named players, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
55–65% (~760 t in 2025)
Refining share
60%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Vanadium matters here because of producer signal: 60-70% (~60,000-70,000 tonnes), refining share: 57%, 3 named players, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
60-70% (~60,000-70,000 tonnes)
Refining share
57%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Tin matters here because of producer signal: ~31-33% (91,000-100,000 tonnes mined), refining share: 50% (185,000-200,000), 1 named player, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
~31-33% (91,000-100,000 tonnes mined)
Refining share
50% · 185,000-200,000
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Molybdenum matters here because of producer signal: ~46% (133,700 tonnes), refining share: 46%, 1 named player, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
~46% (133,700 tonnes)
Refining share
46%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Copper matters here because of producer signal: ~1.8 Mt mining; 43% of refining, refining share: 43%, 2 named players, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
~1.8 Mt mining; 43% of refining
Refining share
43%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Selenium matters here because of producer signal: ~42-50% (~1,500-1,800 t), refining share: 50% (~1,500-1,800), and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
~42-50% (~1,500-1,800 t)
Refining share
50% · ~1,500-1,800
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Tellurium matters here because of producer signal: 180-210 t/yr (35-38%), refining share: 36%, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
180-210 t/yr (35-38%)
Refining share
36%
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Beryllium matters here because of producer signal: ~21% (77 tonnes), refining share: 30% (150 (BeO) + 1,500 (BeCu master alloy)), 3 named players, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
~21% (77 tonnes)
Refining share
30% · 150 (BeO) + 1,500 (BeCu master alloy)
Integrated upstream and refining presence
Gold matters here because of producer signal: ~380 t (largest miner), refining share: 12%, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
~380 t (largest miner)
Refining share
12%
Processing and refining relevance
Tantalum matters here because of refining share: 25% (200-300), 1 named player, and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Refining share
25% · 200-300
Upstream production relevance
Lithium matters here because of producer signal: 17.1% (41,000 tonnes) and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
17.1% (41,000 tonnes)
Upstream production relevance
Tungsten matters here because of producer signal: 83% (67,000 tonnes) and appears in chokepoint analysis.
Producer signal
83% (67,000 tonnes)
Upstream production relevance
Silver matters here because of producer signal: 13% (3,300 tonnes).
Producer signal
13% (3,300 tonnes)
Industrial footprint by material
| Material | Roles | Producer signal | Refining |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gallium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | 99% (primary low-purity) | 99% |
| Graphite | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | 77% (1,230,000 tonnes) | 92% |
| Terbium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | ~90% (separation and refining) | 90% |
| Dysprosium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | 85-90% (refining/separation) | 90% |
| Neodymium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player | 58% mining, 92% magnets (2020) | 90% |
| Germanium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | 80-85% (Yunnan Chihong: 60 t/yr capacity) | 83% · ~1,040 |
| Cobalt | Source, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | N/A | 73% · 170,910 |
| Indium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | 55–65% (~760 t in 2025) | 60% |
| Vanadium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | 60-70% (~60,000-70,000 tonnes) | 57% |
| Tin | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | ~31-33% (91,000-100,000 tonnes mined) | 50% · 185,000-200,000 |
| Molybdenum | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | ~46% (133,700 tonnes) | 46% |
| Copper | Producer, Source, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | ~1.8 Mt mining; 43% of refining | 43% |
| Selenium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Chokepoint | ~42-50% (~1,500-1,800 t) | 50% · ~1,500-1,800 |
| Tellurium | Producer, Source, Refiner, Chokepoint | 180-210 t/yr (35-38%) | 36% |
| Beryllium | Producer, Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | ~21% (77 tonnes) | 30% · 150 (BeO) + 1,500 (BeCu master alloy) |
| Gold | Producer, Source, Refiner, Chokepoint | ~380 t (largest miner) | 12% |
| Tantalum | Refiner, Key Player, Chokepoint | N/A | 25% · 200-300 |
| Lithium | Producer, Source, Chokepoint | 17.1% (41,000 tonnes) | N/A |
| Tungsten | Producer, Source, Chokepoint | 83% (67,000 tonnes) | N/A |
| Silver | Producer, Source | 13% (3,300 tonnes) | N/A |
Companies and industrial actors linked to China
China
State-owned; Songbai, Hunan. Estimated 150 t/yr BeO and ~1,500 t/yr BeCu master alloy capacity.
China
Located in Fuyun, Xinjiang. Substantial beryllium processing capacity; exact figures less documented.
China
Private enterprise accounting for >80% of Chinese beryllium-copper master alloy exports.
China
Largest cobalt refiner globally; DRC mining equity
China
Owns Tenke Fungurume (DRC), one of world's largest Co mines
China
Battery recycling and Co refining; supplies CATL
China
Precursor cathode material; major NMC supplier
China
World's largest battery manufacturer; ~37% global market share
China
One of China's largest copper smelter/refiners
China
World's largest RE producer. Dominant HREE separation from Bayan Obo and southern Chinese IAC deposits.
China
Major HREE producer from ion-adsorption clay deposits in Jiangxi and Fujian.
China
Integrated RE mining, processing, and global trading. Strategic stakes in non-Chinese projects.
China
One of China's largest NdFeB magnet producers. Supplies global EV and wind OEMs.
China
Largest primary gallium producer; extracted during alumina refining
China
Major Chinese gallium refiner
China
Subsidiary of Yunnan Chihong; world's largest Ge producer (~60 t/yr capacity)
China
World's largest anode manufacturer
China
Major synthetic and natural anode supplier
China
Leading synthetic graphite anode producer
China
Estimated capacity 200–250 t/yr; state-owned enterprise; major ITO target supplier. 4N–5N grades.
China
Estimated capacity 150–200 t/yr; state-owned; primary and secondary indium production.
China
Major Chinese Mo and Cu producer with global operations. Vertically integrated from mining to downstream processing.
China
Largest REE producer; operates Bayan Obo mine and separation facilities
China
State-owned consolidation of southern China REE producers
China
REE processing; strategic partner to MP Materials
China
Top 3 global NdFeB magnet manufacturer
China
Major sintered NdFeB magnet producer
China
China's largest Ta refiner. Low-cost processing of African coltan. 200-300 t/year capacity. Limited RMI/ITSCI audit presence.
China
Bayan Obo operator; world's largest RE company. Estimated 120–140 t Tb output/year.
China
Major separator processing ion-adsorption ore. Estimated 80–100 t Tb output/year.
China
Premium separation; high-purity Tb; Terfenol-D alloy supplier. 30–40 t Tb/year.
China
Integrated tungsten + RE company; magnets and phosphor feedstock. 20–30 t Tb/year.
China
Expanding GBD; targeting ~50% of premium magnets by 2025.
China
World's largest tin smelter (60,000-80,000 t/yr capacity). Processes domestic and imported (Myanmar) concentrates. Gejiu district, Yunnan.
China
World's largest vanadium producer, ~16-17% global market share. Full product range (V2O5, FeV, vanadium chemicals). Panzhihua titaniferous magnetite operations.
China
High-purity V2O5 (99.5-99.9%) for aerospace and battery applications. Proprietary vanadium electrolyte production technology. Exports to 30+ countries.
China
Built the world's largest VRFB — Jimusaer project (200 MW / 1,000 MWh) and the 100 MW / 400 MWh Dalian project. Partner of China Three Gorges.
Relevant policy and regulation
2027 (target)
China · China NDRC / Energy Administration
Massive VRFB deployment target would require tens of thousands of tonnes of additional vanadium demand, potentially tightening global supply.
Mar 2026
China · China / Sichuan Province
1.25 MW VRFB installed in commercial building basement — demonstrating non-flammable VRFB suitability for urban environments where lithium-ion is restricted.
Mar 2026
China · Arkansas Congressional Delegation
Request for at least one year's supply of ferrovanadium and aerospace-grade V2O5, citing vulnerability of weapons supply chains to China-Russia supply dominance.
Feb 2026
China · Hunan Province, China
Li-ion and sodium-ion batteries restricted from underground, rooftop, or densely populated building installations. VRFBs remain unrestricted, boosting flow battery demand for urban energy storage.
Feb 2026
China · DRC Ministry of Mines
Export restrictions imposed (quota/licensing details TBD). Exposes China's vulnerability despite 73% refining — dependent on DRC feed. Spot market tightening.
Nov 9, 2025
China · MOFCOM (China)
Temporary relief through Nov 27, 2026. Licensing regime continues. Market uncertainty persists.
Nov 2025
China · MOFCOM / GAC (China)
Suspends October announcements (57, 61, 62) until 2026-11-10. April 2025 controls remain in effect. Creates temporary but uncertain reprieve.
Nov 2025
China · China MOFCOM
Temporary suspension of some export controls, but underlying architecture remains intact. Vanadium not yet directly restricted but risk persists given defense applications.
Oct 2025
China · MOFCOM (China)
Broadens scope to potentially affect energy, automotive, defence, semiconductor, and data centre sectors globally.
Oct 2025
China · MOFCOM (China)
Controls apply to rare earth items produced outside China if containing >0.1% value ratio of China-origin controlled inputs. Semiconductor end-use screening added.
Sep 2025
China · Kachin State armed organisations
Disrupts approximately 50% of Myanmar-to-China RE shipments. Direct constraint on global Dy availability, compounding China export controls.
May 2025
China · Lynas Rare Earths (Malaysia)
Historic milestone: first HREE separation outside China. HREE circuit capacity up to 1,500 t/yr mixed HREE, though Mt Weld ore is LREE-dominated (~2-3% HREE).
Apr 2025
China · MOFCOM / GAC (China)
Controls on REE metals, oxides, compounds, targets, and NdFeB magnets containing Dy/Tb. Licensing requirements for export of listed items.
Apr 2025
China · MOFCOM (China)
Requires special export licences; quotas assigned to approved enterprises. European Dy oxide prices nearly triple within weeks, from ~US$330-380/kg to >US$930/kg by early 2026.
Feb 2025
China · China Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)
Requires special government licensing for exports of strategic-grade Mo materials. Creates supply uncertainty for global importers dependent on Chinese refined Mo products.
Feb 2025
China · MOFCOM (China)
Added bureaucratic hurdles to licensing regime. Demonstrated incremental tightening playbook consistent with gallium/germanium precedent.
Jan 2025
China · USGS
Official confirmation of China's ban; highlights 100% US import dependency.
Dec 2024
China · MOFCOM (China)
Complete ban on Ga shipments to US. Further tightening of supply for American semiconductor manufacturers.
Dec 3, 2024
China · MOFCOM (Announcement No. 46)
Complete ban. Prices reach $2,850-3,000/kg (99.999%). US scrambles for alternative sources.
2024
China · China MIIT
Ion-adsorption clay quotas remain constrained. Policy shifting extraction toward Bayan Obo hard-rock mining.
Nov 2024
China · Bushveld Minerals (South Africa)
Key non-China/Russia primary vanadium producer enters bankruptcy proceedings, reducing Western supply diversity and tightening the non-aligned supply base.
Sep 2024
China · China SAC (Standardization Administration)
Mandates higher vanadium intensity in reinforcing steel for concrete structures. Could increase annual vanadium consumption by 13,000-15,000 tonnes of vanadium nitride at full enforcement.
Dec 2023
China · China MOFCOM
Requires special permits for exporters of highly sensitive graphite products, including battery-grade spherical graphite. South Korea and Japan heavily impacted.
Dec 2023
China · China state media / MOFCOM
Triggered stockpiling behavior and an 18% Tb oxide price spike. Highlighted ongoing geopolitical supply risk.
Aug 2023
China · MOFCOM (China)
All gallium exports require individual license with 45-day approval process. Immediate supply disruption.
Aug 2023
China · MOFCOM (China)
All indium exports require individual license. Introduced alongside gallium and germanium controls. Affects ~70% of global refined supply.
Aug 1, 2023
China · MOFCOM / GACC (China)
95%+ volume drop in August-September. Supply disruption begins. Prices start climbing.
Jul 3, 2023
China · MOFCOM (Announcement No. 27)
All Ge exports require individual license application. No immediate price impact.
2021–2022
China · China MIIT / MOFCOM
Case-by-case export approval required for all rare earth shipments. Estimated 280–320 tonnes Tb oxide approved for export in 2023.
2022
China · US Department of the Interior
Cites 90% supply dependence on China and essential defense applications. IRA allocates >$250M for rare earth mining and processing.
Aug 2022
China · US Congress
EV tax credit ($7,500) requires 40–80% FTA-sourced critical minerals (2023–2027). Only 8% of refined cobalt is IRA-compliant. Excludes China, DRC, Indonesia.
2010-2014
China · China / WTO
Triggered 2011 rare earth price crisis (Dy oxide >US$400/kg). WTO ruling forced removal of export quotas but demonstrated willingness to use RE supply as leverage.
2012
China · China MIIT / MEE
Began restricting ion-adsorption clay mining — the primary HREE-enriched source. Progressive tightening has continued ever since.
Jul 2006
European Union · European Commission
Electronics industry transitions to SAC solder alloys (96.5% Sn). Tin demand for solder increases structurally by ~15-20%. Sets global standard adopted by China RoHS 2.0 and other jurisdictions.
Chokepoints and concentration notes
Beryllium: Three-country refining monopoly: US, China, Kazakhstan — no alternatives exist
Cobalt: China 73% refining — midstream monopoly
Copper: China 43% refining — trade friction risk
Dysprosium: China 85-90% of Dy refining and separation capacity
Dysprosium: Ion-adsorption clay deposits concentrated in southern China and Myanmar Kachin State
Dysprosium: China export licensing (Apr 2025) + expanded controls (Oct 2025)
Dysprosium: Myanmar border disruptions (Sep 2025) constraining ~50% of RE shipments to China
Gallium: China 99% primary gallium production
Gallium: China 98% low-purity gallium refining
Germanium: China 80–85% refining — near-monopoly
Gold: China 12% mining — largest single producer
Graphite: Spheronization and purification IP is highly concentrated in China
Indium: China 55–65% refined indium production
Indium: China dominant share of ITO sputtering target manufacturing
Lithium: China controls midstream chemical conversion
Molybdenum: China ~46% mining + dominant downstream processing — single-country leverage over refined products
Molybdenum: China Feb 2025 export controls (MOFCOM No. 10) on strategic-grade Mo materials
Molybdenum: FeMo production concentrated in China — bottleneck for global steelmakers
Selenium: China ~50% of global refined production
Tantalum: China processes 500+ tonnes/year with limited conflict mineral audit transparency
Tellurium: China 35-38% of global Te production
Terbium: China ~90% of global RE separation capacity — the binding constraint (not mining)
Tin: China >50% of smelting — midstream dominance; net importer of concentrates
Tungsten: The entire supply chain—from mine to APT to powder—is heavily centered in China.
Vanadium: China + Russia = ~85% of primary vanadium mining
Vanadium: China >50% of global refining and processing capacity
Vanadium: China near-monopoly on V2O5-to-VRFB electrolyte conversion
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